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the Rule of Law:A Theory of Legal Reasoning，Oxford:Oxford University Press，2005，p． 1)
② 在“后记”中，哈特对他没有抓住开放性结构的分析的这一重要含义做了修订:“现在，我当然愿意承认，我在书中确实在裁判过程和法
律推理这个主题上，尤其是在我的批评者称为法律原则的这个主题的论证上，都着墨太少了。”(H． L． A． Hart，The Concept of Law，P． A． Bulloch
and J． Raz (ed．) ，Oxford:Clarendon，1994，p． 259．)
③ 比较一下 N． MacCormick，“Particulars and Universals”，In Z． Bankowski and J． MacLean (ed．)，The Universal and the Particular in Legal
Reasoning，Farnham:Ashgate，2006，pp． 3– 22．
④ 比较一下 A． Schiavello，“On‘Coherence’and‘Law’:an Analysis of Different Models”，Ratio Juris，14，2002，pp． 233– 243。
⑤ 麦考密克评论说:“要存在批判行为或事态的共同模式，就依赖于我们的下面构想:有些模式在既定环境中被制定成所有人的共同模
式。在这个问题上，我们能够设想它不依赖我们的意志，但是它并非不依赖我们关于下面情况的信念:我们的社会群体中其他成员的意志
［……］。”(N． MacCormick，Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory，Oxford:Oxford University Press，1994，pp． 287－288)比较一下 R． A． Duff，“Legal
Obligation and the Moral Nature of Law”，The Juridical Review，25，1980，pp． 61 – 87;R． A． Duff，Trials ＆ Punishments，Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press，1986，pp． 74－89。
⑥ J． Raz，“Intention in Interpretation”，In R．P． George(ed．)，The Autonomy of Law:Essays on Legal Positivism，Oxford:Clarendon，1996，pp．
249– 286． 另外，比较一下 S． Bertea，“A Critique of Inclusive－Positivism”，Archiv für Rechts－ und Sozial－philosophie，93，2007，pp． 67– 81。
⑦ 参见 N． MacCormick，H．L． A． Hart，London:Edward Arnold，1981。维拉区分了麦考密克作品的三个不同时期。(V． Villa，“Neil
MacCormick’s Legal Positivism”，In M． Del Mar and Z． Bankowski (ed．)，Law as Institutional Normative Order，Farnham:Ashgate，2009，pp． 45 –
64．)
⑧ 现在，在麦考密克和魏因贝格尔 1986年的著作《制度法论》中它被重印。
⑨ N． MacCormick，Institutions of Law． An Essay in Legal Theory，Oxford:Oxford University Press，2007，p． 277．麦考密克对这一陈述所做的批
判性重构亦可参见 J． Dickson，“Is Bad law Still Law?Is Bad Law Really Law?”In M． Del Mar and Z． Bankowski (ed．)，Law as Institutional Normative
Order，Farnham:Ashgate． 2009，pp． 161– 183．
⑩ M． Hartney，“Dyzenhaus on Positivism and Judicial Obligation”，Ratio Juris，7，1994，pp． 44– 55． 添加了强调。
瑏瑡 H． L． A． Hart，The Concept of Law，P． A． Bulloch and J． Raz (ed．)，Oxford:Clarendon，1994，p． 210．我之所以注意到这部分内容，得益
于迪克逊(Dickson)的引导:J． Dickson，“Is Bad law Still Law?Is Bad Law Really Law?”In M． Del Mar and Z． Bankowski (ed．)，Law as Institutional
Normative Order，Farnham:Ashgate，2009，pp． 161– 183．
瑏瑢 这一模式在德沃金那里被刻画得很清楚:“我将要证明，即使没有能够处理这一案件的既定规则，其中的一方仍可能有权利获胜。即便
在疑难案件中，法官也有责任去找出各方当事人有哪些权利，而不是回溯既往地发明出新的权利。参见 R． Dworkin，Taking Rights Seriously，
Cambridge，MA:Harvard University Press，1978，p． 81．
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Transcending the Declaratory Model and the Decisionist Model:Neil MacCormick＇s
Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
［Italy］Aldo Schiavello
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Chen Wei1 Zhang Zu－liao2
(1．PhilosophySchool of Fudan University，Shanghai 200433;
2．MarxismSchool of Jiangnan University，Wuxi Jiangsu 214122)
【Abstract】This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick’s theory of law and legal
argumentation:In particular，two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective
upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked． The ?rst point concerns
MacCormick’s gradual break with legal positivism，and more speci?cally the thesis that the implicit pretension to
justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions． The second point concerns MacCormick’s
acceptance of the one－right－answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick’s
theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy． The intent，however，is not only to
describe this change in MacCormick’s thought，but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we ?nd in
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory．
【Key words】legal positivism;the implicit pretension to justice of law;the one－right－answer;the declaratory
model;the decisionist model
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